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Deinstitutionalization Of Status
Offenders: In Perspective
Robert W. Sweet, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper traces the historical development of the deinstitutional-
ization of status offenders, culminating in the federal Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,1 its amendments, and
its implementation by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, United States Department of Justice. The paper shows
how this change in juvenile justice law, policy and practice is part of
a larger reform movement in the administration of juvenile justice.
II. TOWARDS A JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
When the first American juvenile court was established at the
close of the nineteenth century, laws penalizing youth for delinquent
behavior had been on the books for more than two centuries.2 In
John Winthrop's "City upon a Hill," the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
where "the most important source of Puritan legal thinking was the
Bible," s a 1654 statute provided for public flogging of children dem-
* President Bush named Mr. Sweet Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), United States Department of Justice, on
April 5, 1990. Mr. Sweet's current responsibilities include the development and imple-
mentation of approximately 50 major discretionary programs covering broad areas, in-
cluding gang violence, drug abuse, privitization, school dropouts, and missing and
exploited children. Mr. Sweet received his B.A. in English from the University of
Maine has continued post-graduate studies at the University of New Hampshire and
Brandeis University.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5778 (1988).
2. The earliest known law in America relating to delinquent children was passed
in 1641 by the Massachusetts Bay Colony. See W. SANDERS, JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR
A THOUSAND YEARS: READINGS FROM ANGLO-SAXON TIMES TO 1900, at 317 n.1 (1970).
As early as the fifth century B.C., the Twelve Tables provided for lesser penalties for
children by reason of their immaturity. For a discussion of early concepts of child
crime, see B. GRIFFIN & C. GRIFFIN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN PERSPECTIVE 5-9
(1978).
3. K.T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 56 (1986).
onstrating disrespect for their parents.4 Common law principles had
long established that a child below the age of seven lacked the ability
to form criminal intent (mens rea) and, hence, to commit a culpable
criminal act.5
III. FROM HOUSE OF REFUGE TO REFORM SCHOOL
Specialized institutions for delinquent youth preceded the juvenile
court by nearly seventy-five years. "Houses of Refuge" were founded
in New York (1825),6 Boston (1826),7 and Philadelphia (1829)8 for
the rehabilitation of "wayward" youth who had yet to commit a seri-
ous crime, but whose "life circumstances" were believed to portend
such a path.9 They were followed by state reform, industrial, and
4. L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY: ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION 76
(1978). "In actual practice, however, courts and juries were often lenient towards the
young. Children were often acquitted after a nominal trial or pardoned if found
guilty." Id. The first law against contributing to the delinquency of a minor was en-
acted by the General Court of Massachusetts in 1672. The law made it a criminal of-
fense to "lure children away from work or studies." For a review of colonial treatment
of juvenile crime, see B. GRIFFIN & C. GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 9-11. For a contempo-
raneous account, see SANDERS, supra note 1, at 317-20.
5. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 729-32 (1957). "Between the ages of eight, and
fourteen, they might be presumed innocent unless proven otherwise.... Anyone over
the age of fourteen, presumably, was judged as an adult, although some colonies made
exceptions." L. EMPEY, supra note 4, at 75.
6. Kinds of Punishment that May be used in the House of Refuge:
(1.) Privation of play and exercise.
(2.) Sent to bed supperless at sunset.
(3.) Bread and Water, for breakfast, dinner, and supper.
(4.) Gruel without salt for breakfast, dinner, and supper.
(5.) Camomile, boneset, or bitter herb tea for breakfast, dinner and supper.
(6.) Confinement in solitary cells.
(7. Corporal punishment, if absolutely necessary, or if awarded by a jury of
the boys, and approved.
(8.) Fetters and handcuffs, only in extreme cases.
Hart, Documents Relative to the House of Refuge Instituted by the Society for the Ref-
ormation of Juvenile Delinquents in the City of New-York, in 1824 (1832), in W. SAND-
ERS, supra note 2, at 348.
7. "A boy shall not be deprived of his food more than one meal for the same
fault, nor in ordinary cases shall he be kept on bread and water for more than three or
four days." City of Boston, Report of the Standing Committee of the Common Council
on the Subject of the House of Reformation for Juvenile Offenders (1832), in W. SAND-
ERS, supra note 2, at 362.
8. Some have supposed the restraints imposed in this establishment, were in-
consistent with the liberty of the citizen, and especially with that clause of the
Constitution, which secures to every one a trial by jury....
The House of Refuge is intended to obviate not merely the sentence of in-
famy and pain, which follows a trial and conviction, but to prevent the trial
and conviction itself.
Committee of the Board of Managers of the Philadelphia House of Refuge, The Design
and Advantages of the House of Refuge (1835), in W. SANDERS, supra note 2, at 366
(emphasis in original).
9. By 1860, sixteen such institutions had been founded in the United States. For
a contemporaneous account of the Houses of Refuge and their rationale, see G. DE
BEAUMONT AND A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, Du SYST]tME PtNITENTIARE AUX ETATS UNIS
(1883). See also W. SANDERS, supra note 2, at 341-72, 388-91.
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training schools10 designed to inculcate discipline and the work skills
and habits for "an honest trade" in Massachusetts (1847),11 New York
(1849), and Maine (1853).
The reformatory plan embodied the following principles [among others]: (1)
Young offenders must be segregated from the corrupting influences of adult
criminals. (2) "Delinquents" need to be removed from their environment
and imprisoned for their own good and protection. 12 Reformatories should
be guarded sanctuaries . . . . (3) "Delinquents" should be assigned to
reformatories without trial and with minimal legal requirements. Due pro-
cess is not required because reformatories are intended to reform and not to
punish. (4) Sentences should be indeterminate, so that inmates are en-
couraged to cooperate in their own reform and recalcitrant "delinquents" are
not allowed to resume their criminal careers. (5) Reformation should not be
confused with sentimentality .... 13
The ideal of the new "Age of Treatment" was expressed most suc-
cinctly by Zebulon Brockway, Superintendent of New York's Elmira
Reformatory, who wrote, "[rieformation is socialization of the anti-
social by scientific training while under completest governmental
control."14
Reform schools, like prisons before them, were hailed as humane,
progressive innovations. However, many were, "in reality, juvenile
prisons, with prison bars, prison cells, prison garb, prison labor,
10. These three types of schools were very similar in practice; it was the terminol-
ogy that evolved. "The industrial schools can be considered to have been somewhat
successful, since reform schools began to call themselves industrial schools and, when
that name became suspect, training schools. These institutions nevertheless remained
under criticism for their harsh custodial treatment of children." B. GRIFFIN & C. GRIF-
FIN, supra note 2, at 17.
11. One rationale was economical.
It can hardly be considered as admitting of a query which will be the most
economical for the State-to place herself at once in loco parentis, assume the
burden; support and train them for useful stations when they shall reach their
majority, or leave them in their present neglect and viciousness, to become in-
evitably the prodigals of her court house, and the population of her jails.
First Annual Report of the Trustees of the State Industrial Training School for Girls,
at Lancaster (Boston 1857), in W. SANDERS, supra note 2, at 388. The first reform or
training school was the Lyman School for Boys, which opened in Westboro, Massachu-
setts in 1846.
12. "There is no conflict between the state and the child. The state accepts the
child into its protection and seeks to help the child to grow into a useful citizen."
Schramm, Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, in THE PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY 272 (S.
Glueck ed. 1959) See also Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 10 ("[The delinquent] is society's
child, and therefore the interests of the state and the child do not conflict but
coincide.").
13. A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 54 (1969).
14. A. PLATT, supra note 13, at 67 (quoting Z. BROCKWAY, FIFTY YEARS OF PRISON
SERVICE 308-09, 393 (1912)). For biographical information regarding Brockway, see id.
at 47-48.
prison punishments and prison discipline."' 5
Reform schools, however, differed from prisons in their practice of
indeterminate sentences. As Enoch Wines,'6 Secretary of the New
York Prison Association, and Theodore Dwight, the first Dean of Co-
lumbia Law School, leading proponents of the reformatory plan, ad-
vised the New York state legislature in 1867:
The ultimate aim of penal policy was reformation of the criminal, which could
only be achieved "by placing the prisoner's fate, as far as possible, in his own
hand, by enabling him, through industry and good conduct to raise himself,
step by step, to a position of less restraint .... ,,17
IV. OF LAWS AND COURTS
As juvenile detention centers permeated America, new laws were
enacted. By 1870, eighteen states institutionalized youths for "way-
ward behavior" either by constituting it as a criminal offense (e.g.,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio) or by broadening the commit-
tal grounds for noncriminal conduct (e.g., Connecticut, Kentucky,
Louisiana, New York).' 8
As the numbers of juvenile institutions and their involuntary in-
habitants proliferated, challenges to state authority over unruly chil-
dren were rare and largely procedural in nature. They generally fell
on deaf judicial ears.' 9
An exception to the rule was the 1870 Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion in People ex re. O'Connell v. Turner,20 which found that a
child's right to liberty could not be infringed for any reason without
15. H. HART, PREVENTATIVE TREATMENT OF NEGLECTED CHILDREN 11 (1910).
In our old buildings we had cells wherein each boy was locked up for the
night. I confess that with all my endeavors to make myself believe that these
boys were not prisoners, that the building was not a prison, that I was not a
jailer, were utterly unavailing. In vain did I tell the boys that after I had
locked them in, I should go and lock myself in. But, oh, says one of the dis-
cerning ones, "Mr. Nichols, you hold the keys."
Rev. D.B. Nichols, Superintendent, Second Annual Report of the Officers of the Chi-
cago Reform School ... for the Year Ending November 30, 1857 (Chicago: 1857), in W.
SANDERS, supra note 2, at 393 (emphasis in original).
16. For biographical data on "the foremost American authority on reformatories
and institutions for children prior to the twentieth century," see A. PLATr, supra note
13, at 48-50. Enoch Wines' son Frederick was a significant penologist in his own right.
17. M. GRUNHUT, PENAL REFORM 90 (1948).
18. Zatz, Problems and Issues in Deinstitutionalizatiom" Laws, Concepts, and
Goals, in NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTTrUTIONALIZATION OF STA-
TUS OFFENDERS 19 (J. Handler & J. Zatz eds., 1982).
19. For a typical response, see Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 2 (1838)
Where reformation, and not punishment, is the end.... may not the natural
parents, when unequal to the task of education, or unworthy of it, be super-
seded by parens patriae, or common guardian of the community? ... [Where
they [parents] are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent the public
from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously are, at its suffer-
ance? The right of parental control is a natural, but not an unalienable one.
Id.
20. 55 Ill. 280 (1870).
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due process of law. Heretofore, when accused of committing children
without proof of crime or due process, those incarcerating children
customarily claimed that their professed rehabilitative goals did not
require such measures because restraint of liberty was required for
treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, questioned the be-
neficent mission of such coercive state intervention and held that the
wayward child's liberty was as precious as that of the adult
criminal's.21
While subsequent decisions reaffirmed the judicial norm, 22 the
Turner. court's "exception" was limited in scope. It did not abrogate
the doctrine of parens patriae,23 "the best known source of the idea
of the juvenile court."24
V. THE JUVENILE COURT
Indeed, it was the Illinois state legislature that launched "the most
21. Executive clemency can not open the prison doors, for no offense has been
committed. The writ of habeas corpus, a writ for the security of liberty, can
afford no relief, for the sovereign power of the State, as parens patriae has
determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such a restraint upon natural
liberty is tyranny and oppression. If, without crime, without conviction of any
offense, the children of the State are to be thus confined for the "good of Soci-
ety," then Society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free gov-
ernment acknowledged a failure.... Even criminals can not be convicted and
imprisoned without due process of law ....
Id. at 286-87.
22. It is insisted that the law under which the proceeding was had is unconsti-
tutional... in violation of the Bill of Rights... provision that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and The
People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, is relied upon ... in this respect....
It is not natural but civil liberty of which a person may not be deprived
without due process of law....
We find here no more than such proper restraint which the child's welfare
and the good of the community manifestly require....
In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 370, 373 (1882) See also Ex parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876);
Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209 (1880); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198
(1905).
23. As parens patriae, the state, substituting for the king, invested the juve-
nile court with the power to act as a parent of the child. The judge was to
assume a fatherly role, protecting the juvenile in order to cure and save him.
The juvenile court withheld from the child the procedural safeguards granted
to adults because it viewed him as having the right to custody rather than the
right to liberty, and juvenile proceedings were civil, not criminal.
Reasons, Gault" Procedural Change and Substantive Fffect, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 163,
164 (1970). The principle of parens patriae evolved from the English courts of chan-
cery or equity in Eyre v. Shqftsbury (1772). Id. at 164 n.3.
24. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME; REPORT ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND CONSULTATION PA.
PERS 2 (1967).
significant advance in the administration of justice since the Magna
Charta"25 when it passed the Juvenile Court Act in 1899.26 The Act
and its amendments brought cases of neglect, dependency, and delin-
quency under a single jurisdiction.
It defined a "delinquent child" broadly as a male under seventeen
or female under eighteen who
violates any law of this State; or is incorrigible, or knowingly associates with
thieves; vicious or immoral persons; or without just cause and . . . consent of
its parents... or custodian absents itself from its home .... or is growing up
in idleness and crime; or knowingly frequents a house of ill repute; or... any
policy shop or place where any gambling device is operated; ... saloon...; or
... public pool room...; or wanders about the streets in the night time with-
out being on any lawful business ... ; or habitually wanders about any rail-
road yards...; or enters any car... without lawful authority; or uses vile,
obscene, vulgar, or indecent language in any public place .. .; or is guilty of
indecent and lascivious conduct.2 7
While the founding fathers of the juvenile court claimed ancestors
in the mother country's courts of equity or chancery, less partial ob-
servers deemed such relations "dubious exercises at best, and in the
words of a wry English judge, little more than spurious justifications
for the sometimes 'highhanded methods of American judges'...
[since] equity procedure clearly requires evidentiary findings within
specific able limits conspicuously lacking in our early juvenile court
statutes." 28
The paternity of the juvenile court, however, could scarcely be con-
25. The accolade was accorded by Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law
School. R. Pound, The Juvenile Court and the Law, in NATIONAL PROBATION AND PA-
ROLE YEARBOOK, 1944, at 13 (1945). For a review of the Illinois juvenile court from
1899 to 1927, see H. LOu, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927).
26. The first revision in court procedure for American youth occurred in 1870 in
Boston when separate hearings were required to try juvenile offenders. Special provi-
sions for the trials of juveniles were made in Indiana (1891), New York (1892), and
Rhode Island (1898). For forerunners to the juvenile court, see S. ROBISON, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: ITS NATURE AND CONTROL 227-28 (1960).
27. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899, § 1. See also A. PLATT, supra note 13, at 138.
Nor did the situation change significantly over the next half century: "The statutes
defining juvenile delinquency ... embrace a bewildering variety of kinds of conduct
.... [Various statutes include within the purview of 'delinquency' certain noncriminal
acts: for example, smoking cigarettes .. " Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect and De-
pendency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVE-
NILE COURT IN TRANSITION 44, 49-51 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962) (quoted in 0. KETCHAM
& M. PAULSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS RELATING TO JUVENILE COURTS 151 (1967)).
See also, S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY-A RATIONAL APPROACH TO
PENAL PROBLEMS 49 (1961).
28. Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quests and Realties, in TASK FORCE ON JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE, supra note 24 at 91-92. See also E. LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL
CHANGE: REVOLUTION IN THE JUVENILE COURT 24-26 (1970) [hereinafter SOCIAL AC-
TION].
Dean Pound, an enthusiast of the juvenile court, concedes it was invented by "a few
socially minded judges" who tried to reconcile their creation with "historical legal dog-
mas." R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 135 (1923). For arguments that
the juvenile court is primarily of chancery origin, see H. LOu, supra note 25 at 2-7.
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tested. The court was the offspring of the child welfare reform
movement and it was not eager to cut the umbilical cord.29 Its first
probation officers were members of one of the movement's principal
lobbies, the Juvenile Protective Association. Although the child ad-
vocates failed in their attempts to prevent public employees from
staffing the juvenile court, they succeeded in cementing the court's
ties with the social service and mental health professions.3o
VI. THE COURT CASTS ITS NET
Within a dozen years, twenty-two states had followed Illinois' ex-
ample, and by 1917, all but three states had established juvenile court
systems.31 As the number of juvenile courts grew (to some 600 by
1932),32 so did their judicial domain. It soon encompassed all children
who violated local or state laws or who were physically or morally
neglected or endangered in conformance with "the critical philosoph-
ical position of the reform movement.., that no formal, legal distinc-
tions should be made between the delinquent and the dependent and
the neglected."33
Persisting in the belief that waywardness was a harbinger of crimi-
nality, the juvenile court cast its net of parens patriae far and wide.34
More than half the delinquency cases brought before the Cook
County juvenile court in its early years involved such charges as "in-
corrigibility," "truancy," "vagrancy," "immorality," and "disorderly
behavior."35
29. Rapid growth in urban density also played a role in the creation of the juvenile
court. In 1800, no American city had a population of 100,000. By 1900, thirty seven did.
See Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in Processing Offenders,
23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoEs. 508, 510 (1958).
30. J. HANDLER & J. ZATZ, supra note 18, at 21.
31. The last state to enact juvenile court legislation was Montana in 1945. For
dates of other laws, see G. COSULICH, JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES:
TOPICAL AND STATE BY STATE SUMMARIES OF THEIR MAIN PROVISIONS 9-12 (1939).
32. Today there are more than 2000 courts handling juvenile delinquency matters,
encompassing every American jurisdiction, including the District of Columbia.
33. J. HANDLER & J. ZATz, supra note 18, at 9.
34. [I]t is proposed that the court be given jurisdiction over all children's cases, not
merely serious defectives and delinquents.... [E]ducational agents could turn to the
court for backing against recalcitrant parents in securing remedial measures early in
the process of aberration. Eliot, The Juvenile Court and the Educational System, J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 25 (1923-24), quoted in 0. KETCHAM & M. PAULSEN,
supra note 27, at 13.
35. T. HURLEY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 3
(1900). See also, T. HURLEY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COOK COUNTY JUVENILE
COURT 2 (1901).
As Judge Julian Mack of the Chicago juvenile court proclaimed:
Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders... as a wise
and merciful father handles his own child whose errors are not discovered by
the authorities? Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely
whether a boy or a girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is
... and then if it learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality,
to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform .... 36
VII. THE COURT'S CRITICS
Through the "socializing" of court procedure, the juvenile court,
like the reformatory, came to specialize in "treatment without
trial."37 A candid observer noted that "the Juvenile Court is con-
ceived in the spirit of the clinic; it is a kind of laboratory of human
behavior." 38 One of the twentieth century's outstanding authorities
on the law of evidence, John Wigmore, charged that the promoters of
the juvenile court had "gone to the borderline of prudence in their
iconoclasm" and that "the orthodox rules of trial evidence have been
riddled as with a reformative machine-gun."3 9
36. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV., 104, 107 (1909). Judge Mack's
views were shared by many, including Cook County Assistant State Attorney Albert
Barnes, who advised the State Attorneys Association:
The State must step in and exercise guardianship over a child found under
such adverse social or individual conditions as develop crime. To that end, it
mustnot wait as now to deal with him in jails, bridewells, and reformatories
after he has become criminal in habit and tastes, but must seize upon the first
indications of the propensity as they may be evidenced in his conditions of ne-
glect or delinquency.
Report of the Chicago Bar Association Juvenile Court Committee, October 28, 1889.
The answer to Judge Mack's inquiry was supplied nearly three quarters of a century
later by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency: "(1). The law favors the lib-
erty of the individual. (2). When government has available a variety of equally effec-
tive means to a given end, it must choose the one which interferes least with individual
liberty." National Council on Crime and Delinquency, The Nondangerous Offender
Should Not Be Imprisoned A Policy Statement, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 449, 449 (1973).
37. "These various methods of applying court treatment without a full and fair ju-
dicial trial of the issue of guilt of a particular offense, despite their seductive rationale,
appear.., to be peculiarly hazardous and.., resemble too closely in some respects the
philosophy of the Star Chamber." Tappan, Treatment Without Trial, in THE PROBLEM
OF DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 293. See also Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 2
NEB. L. REv. 547 (1950). Dunham cites the following factors as developing the juvenile
court's "social-agency image":
(1) the aggressive social-work orientation of the United States Children's
Bureau;
(2) the broadening jurisdiction of the juvenile court to include.. .all matters
of a legal nature involving children;
(3) the gradual professionalization of social work;
(4) various court decisions involving delinquency; and
(5) the growing prospect of treatment through.., psychoanalysis ....
Dunham, supra note 29, at 513.
38. Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, in E. HOAG & E. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIME, ABNORMAL MINDS AND THE LAw 158 (1923).
39. 5 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 145 (3d ed. 1940). The following excerpt from a juvenile
court report gives evidence of Wigmore's charge: "[Tihe justices have been enabled to
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In a study of the reform movement that inspired America's juve-
nile justice system, Anthony Platt concluded that criticism of the ju-
venile court system in the first half of the twentieth century arose
primarily from two perspectives, that of the "legal moralists" and
that of the "constitutionalists."40
Legal moralists subscribe to the philosophy of "retributive" justice
which upholds society's moral right and duty to punish those who
willfully commit crimes. A crime that we do not punish is a contra-
diction in terms. As A.L. Goodhart has observed, "a community
which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer may end by condoning
the crime."41 Regarding the criminal law as the symbol of the socie-
tal values violated by the criminal, the legal moralists believe that
"the punishment must fit the crime." 42
Constitutionalists, on the other hand, question ideals more often
professed than practiced by the juvenile court, which frequently vio-
late personal rights under the guise of "rehabilitation." As Edward
Lindsey, an early constitutionalist proponent, observed, "[Tihere is
often a very real deprivation of liberty, nor is that fact changed by
refusing to call it punishment or because the good of the child is
stated to be the object." 4 3 The juvenile court's use or abuse of the
judicial robes of parens patrae as a cloak for the denial of constitu-
tional protections has come under particular criticism by the
constitutionalists.44
scrap once and for all the old legal trial of children with its absurd and obsolete limita-
tions of testimony and to inquire into the causes of the children's neglect or delin-
quency untrammelled by narrow rules of evidence." Children's Court of the City of
New York, ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1925).
40. For further analysis, see A. PLATr, supra note 13 at 152-63.
41. A.L. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 92-93 (1953).
42. mhe social workers and the psychologists and the psychiatrists know
nothing of crime and wrong. They refer to "reactions" and "maladjustments"
and "complexes." ... The people need to have the moral law dinned into their
consciences every day in the year. The juvenile court does not do that. And
to segregate a large share of daily crime into the juvenile court is to take a
long step toward undermining the whole criminal law.
Note, Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 Nw. U.L. REV. 375, 376-77 (1926).
43. Lindsey, The Juvenile Court Movement from a Lawyer's Standpoint, in AN.
NALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 145 (1924).
44. [IThe supporters of the unrestricted social processes in a court of law for
children and their parents have embraced the catchwords parens patriae and
chancery as something equivalent to little or no legal restraint so that they
may cast the beneficent safeguards of due process of law into the limbo of for-
gotten things. Nothing could be more fallacious.
Address by Chief Justice W. Bruce Cobb, New York City Court of Domestic Relations,
VIII. JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: THE 1960S
A number of developments during the 1960s stimulated reform in
the juvenile justice system. They arose, in particular, from (1) the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administra-
tion of Justice, (2) the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
and (3) the Supreme Court. These and subsequent reforms in the
early 1970s would provide the impetus for the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.
A. The President's Commission
Established in 1965, the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice (the Commission) made sig-
nificant contributions to juvenile justice reform.
Seeing police apprehension and court referral as signs of civic fail-
ure and finding little likelihood of therapeutic rehabilitation, the
Commission focused public attention on delinquency prevention. The
Commission believed that juvenile courts unnecessarily stigmatized
youth by labeling them "delinquent," thus diminishing their chances
of rehabilitation. 45 It concluded that both juvenile and adult courts
had failed to achieve their goals.
Rejecting the contention that "the time has come to jettison the
experiment," the Commission stated that: "[w]hat is required is
rather a revised philosophy of the juvenile court, based on recogni-
tion that in the past our reach exceeded our grasp."46
Accordingly, the Commission counseled several steps to improve
the administration of juvenile justice.
(1) The formal system should be used only as a last resort.
Rather, dispositional alternatives must be developed.47
(2) Efforts to narrow the juvenile court's jurisdiction should be
Joint Meeting of the Committees of the Court of Domestic Relations, the Association
of the Bar, and the County Lawyers Association (Feb. 6, 1945).
Dr. Paul Tappan has described parens patriae as "an ex post facto fiction" designed
to reconcile the juvenile court, more akin to contemporary administrative bureaucra-
cies than to early equity, with orthodox legal doctrine. See P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY 169 (1949).
45. Ironically, the term "delinquent" was coined to avoid the stigma attached to
the label "criminal."
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a criminal; to
save it form the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to
take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to pro-
tect it from the stigma,-this is the work which is now being accomplished...
even with the most of the delinquent children through the court that repre-
sents the parens patriae power of the state....
Mack, supra note 36, at 109 (emphasis added).
46. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 81 (1967).
47. Id.
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continued. "Serious consideration . . .should be given to com-
plete elimination of the court's power over children for noncrim-
inal conduct."48
(3) Procedural justice for the child should be instituted. "The
major rationale for the withdrawal of procedural safeguards
ceases to exist."4 9
(4) As alternatives to formal juvenile justice system processing,
the President's Commission recommended expanded use of non-
judicial community agencies.50
The Commission also made specific recommendations regarding
use of detention and incarceration:
[1] For children for whom detention is made necessary only by the unavaila-
bility of adequate parental supervision, there should be low-security commu-
nity residential centers and similar shelters.
[2] Legislation should be enacted restricting both authority to detain and the
circumstances under which detention is permitted.
[3] Correctional authorities should develop more extensive community pro-
grams providing special, intensive treatment as an alternative to institutional-
ization for both juvenile and adult offenders. 5 1
B. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency
At the request of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency (NCCD) surveyed state and local correctional agen-
cies and institutions across the United States in 1966. The survey
documented extensive use of detention facilities to house juveniles
accused of noncriminal conduct. While such detention was permitted
under broadly written state juvenile court statutes, it often occurred
without the benefit of court petitions. Wide variations in detention
rates and lengths of stay compounded the problem. NCCD concluded
that "[c]onfusion and misuse pervade detention. It has come to be
used by police and probation officers as a disposition; judges use it for
punishment, protection, [and] storage .... 52
As a result of its survey, NCCD recommended that:
No child should be placed in any detention facility unless he is a delinquent or
alleged delinquent and there is a substantial probability that he will commit
an offense dangerous to himself or the community or will run away pending
48. Id. at 85.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 83.
51. Id. at 87, 171.
52. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Correction in the United States,
in TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 115, 129 (1967).
court disposition. He should not be detained for punishment or for someone's
convenience.55
The NCCD survey also documented problems in the use of juvenile
training schools, concluding that: "[i]n theory, training schools are
specialized facilities for changing children relatively hardened in de-
linquency. In practice ... they house a nonselective population and
are primarily used in ways which make the serving of their theoreti-
cal best purpose... beside the point."54
C. Supreme Court Decisions
Well into the latter half of the twentieth century, the courts con-
tinued to uphold the juvenile court's restrictions of traditional due
process protections. As the Supreme Court held in In re Holmes,
"[s]ince juvenile courts are not criminal courts, the constitutional
rights granted to persons accused of crime are not applicable to chil-
dren brought before them."55
The 1960s witnessed increased challenges to the doctrine of parens
patriae. Critics questioned whether youth were receiving the individ-
ual treatment the juvenile courts were created to provide. And, if
not, why were they denied the due process protections even adult
criminals enjoy?56
Four Supreme Court decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s
brought important changes to the administration of juvenile justice.
In 1966, in Kent v. United States,57 the Court began to extend due
process rights to juveniles, finding evidence, in Justice Abe Fortas'
words, "that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children."56
That same year Miranda v. Arizona59 required police to advise
53. Id. at 211. A study nearly a decade later found status offenders were incarcer-
ated as long or longer than juvenile delinquents who committed rape, aggravated as-
sault, and other felonies classified as "FBI index crimes." See Ohio Youth
Commission, A STATISTICAL INQUIRY INTO LENGTH OF STAY AND THE REVOLVING
DOOR, 1974.
54. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 52, at 143. "The typical state
training school does not always have provisions for the special care and treatment ....
In some places, habitual truants and neglected and dependent children are placed in
the same institution as offenders.... There is also a tendency for the more hardened
youngsters to set the pace." COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY, A REPORT ON STATE ACTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 29 (1962).
55. In Re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599 (1954). For a discussion of this case, see P. TAPPAN,
CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 390-92 (1960). See also M. HASKELL AND LEWIS
YABLONSKY, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 395-96 (1974).
56. See Ketcham, The UikfuUfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 97, 100-07 (1961).
57. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
58. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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juveniles taken into custody for a felony offense, or an offense that
could result in adjudication of delinquency and commitment to a se-
cured facility, of certain constitutional rights, including the right to
remain silent and the right to consult an attorney before
questioning.6 O
The following year the Supreme Court's In re Gault6 l ruling
granted additional due process rights to juveniles facing incarcera-
tion, including notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to con-
frontation and cross-examination, and the privilege against self-
incrimination.62 Justice Fortas reflected the Court's sentiments
when he wrote, "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults only. Under our constitution, the condition of be-
ing a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."63
Prior to 1970 the standard for determining guilt in delinquency
proceedings was a "preponderance" of available evidence. In re Win-
ship,64 decided by the Supreme Court in 1970, held that due process
required that the state prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" facts es-
tablishing a juvenile's delinquency.6 5
At the same time, In re Gault and subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions66 made clear that the juvenile court was not to be equated with
the criminal proceedings of adult courts. In McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania,6 7 the Court even expressed its hope for the juvenile court
system as a separate process.
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a description of such "Miranda
rights," see R. KOBETz, THE POLICE ROLE AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 108-109 (1971).
See also Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. CRiM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 534 (1987). For discussion of waiver, see Grisso, Juvenile's Capacities
to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980).
61. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
62. The effects of such reforms are not always clear. Lemert's California study
suggests that use of counsel in juvenile cases has increased dismissals and decreased
the removal of children from their homes. However, the Duffee and Siegal report
shows more severe court dispositions for youth represented by attorneys. See E.
LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION, supra note 28, at 192; Duffee & Siegal, The Organization
Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court, 7- CRIM. L. BULL., 544, 552 (1971).
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1328 (1967).
64. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
65. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
66. See e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). For a review of consti-
tutional issues, see Gilman, The Constitutionality of Juvenile Court Administration of
Court Services, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING:
READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 465-74 (1981).
67. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
IX. JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM: THE 1970s
In addition to the changes wrought by the Supreme Court, further
juvenile justice reform arose in the early 1970s from: (1) the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, (2)
radical changes in the juvenile correctional system in Massachusetts,
and (3) the labeling theory.
A. The National Advisory Commission
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals (the Advisory Commission) identified its own concerns re-
garding detention problems.68 Observing that "many agencies have
advocated that detention be limited to allegedly delinquent offenders
who require secure custody for the protection of others," the Advi-
sory Commission determined that "persons in need of supervision"
(PINS),69 or "minors in need of supervision" (MINS)70-who later
came to be called "status offenders"-comprised at least fifty percent
of most detention populations.71
This ratio and the deplorable conditions the Advisory Commission
found in detention centers and jails7 2 prompted it to propose that
the delinquency jurisdiction of the court should be limited to those juveniles
who commit acts that if committed by an adult would be criminal, and that
juveniles accused of delinquent conduct would not under any circumstances
be detained in facilities for housing adults accused or convicted of crime....
Detention should be considered as a last resort where no other reasonable
alternative is available.
Detention should be used only where the juvenile has no parent, guardian,
custodian, or other person able to provide supervision and care for him and to
assure his presence at subsequent judicial hearings.
Juveniles should not be detained in jails, lockups, or other facilities used for
adults.7 3
Sharing the Supreme Court's hope in the promise of the juvenile
68. The Commission, appointed by the Law Enforcement Administration in 1971,
formulated the first national criminal justice standards and goals for crime reduction
and prevention. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME (1974); NATIONAL ADvI-
SORY COMMISSION REPORT(S) ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, POLICE, COURTS,
CORRECTIONS (1974) [hereinafter REPORT ON CORRECTIONS]; NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MISSION COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION, (1974).
69. New York Family Court Act § 712 (1963). See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 374
n.6.
70. Illinois Family Court Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para 2001-2036 (Smith-Hurd
1990) (1966). Synonymous acronyms include CHINS and JINS for children and
juveniles in need of supervision, respectively.
71. REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 68, 257.
72. For an expose on America's incarcerated children, see K. WOODEN, WEEPING
IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS (1976). See also H. JAMES, CHILDREN IN TROUBLE (1970).
73. REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 68, at 259.
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court, the Advisory Commission urged reform "to improve the effec-
tiveness of the court process as part of a rehabilitative juvenile jus-
tice system"7 4 To this end, the Commission recommended that the
juvenile courts should only be authorized to institutionalize delin-
quents whose offenses would be crimes if committed by adults. 75
B. Revolutionary Reform in Massachusetts
The warehousing of juveniles in large training schools had been
under attack since its creation. Critics charged that they were
"schools of crime," produced high recidivism rates, were custodial
rather than therapeutic, and denied their inmates due process.
In 1969, the Massachusetts Director of Youth Services resigned fol-
lowing a series of crises in the state's training schools. His successor,
Dr. Jerome Miller, took office with a mandate to develop new pro-
grams. Over the next two years, Miller established "therapeutic com-
munities" within the state's existing training schools, but adherents
of the old custodial philosophy resisted his reforms. By 1971, Miller
concluded that therapeutic communities could not be run success-
fully within the traditional training schools and closed them. They
were replaced by a network of decentralized community-based serv-
ices (and a few, small secure-care units for violent juvenile
offenders). 76
The Massachusetts revolution constituted the most sweeping re-
forms in youth corrections in the United States since the establish-
ment of juvenile training schools and juvenile courts in the
nineteenth century. It demonstrated that juvenile corrections need
not be centered around large training schools. 77 Twenty years later,
the community-based system Miller initiated in Massachusetts is still
in place.78
74. Id. at 291.
75. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Re-
port on Courts, 293.
76. A. MILLER, L. OHLIN & R. LOATES, A THEORY OF SOCIAL REFORM: CoRREc-
TIONAL CHARGE PROCESSES IN TWO STATES 14-15 (1977).
77. Id. at 16-19.
78. Loughran, Refocusing on Prevention of Delinquency, Educ. Week, Mar. 21,
1990, at 32. For an analysis of the JJDP Act's impact in Massachusetts, see Arnaud &
Mack, The Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders in Massachusetts: The Role of the
Private Sector, in NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF STATUS OFFENDERS 335-371 (J. Handler & J. Zatz eds. 1982).
Most of Massachusetts' 1700 committed youth are involved in community-based resi-
dential and non-residential programs, while the minority of violent offenders (15%)
are in small secure facilities. A 1989 study by the National Council on Crime and De-
C. The Labeling Theory
"Labeling" became a popular, if not formal, theory in the United
States during the 1960s. Proponents argued that most juveniles
would mature out of delinquency if left alone. They charged that
agents of control exacerbate delinquency by setting into motion a
self-fulfilling prophecy by officially labeling youths as "bad" or "de-
linquent" as a result of overly dramatizing initial wayward acts.
Labeling theorists contend that youths repeatedly labeled "delin-
quent" by police, judges and probation officers, come to see them-
selves as such officials do. They live up, or rather down, to their
image. Hence, the likelihood of subsequent delinquent behavior is
increased.79
Dr. LaMar Empey has succinctly stated the policy implications of
labeling. According to Empey, American society has tended to react
by viewing juvenile courts as an agency of last resort reserved for
only the most serious juvenile offenders.8 0 Consequently, three re-
forms have been pursued:
(1) decriminalization-narrowing the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, par-
ticularly over status offenders;
(2) diversion-turning juveniles away from the juvenile justice system and
into other social agencies for help;
(3) due process-requiring the juvenile court to become a court by insuring
that alleged delinquents are provided with the constitutional protections af-
forded adults.8 1
Empey paused to reflect: "Since this is what the juvenile court set
out to do in the first place, only the passage of time will tell whether
our fervent 'reforms' are more humane and helpful than were those
of the 19th century child savers."8 2
X. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT
In August 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974. President Gerald Ford signed
it into law on September 7, 1974.
Three years of Congressional hearings had preceded enactment of
the JJDP Act.83 The implications, for juvenile justice reform found
linquency shows that the Massachusetts system has a lower rate of recidivism than
California's training schools (23% versus 62%) and that placing only violent offenders
in secure care is more cost-effective. Massachusetts Has Lowest Rate of Recidivism, 18
Juv. JUST. DIG. (1990).
79. L. EMPEY, supra note 3, at 341-68. See also H. BECKER,. OUTSIDERS; STUDIES IN
THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); E. LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC
APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR (1951); and. F. TANNENBAUM,
CRIME AND THE COMMUNrrY (1938).
80. See L. EMPEY, supra note 4.
81. Id. at 364-65.
82. Id. at 365.
83. See especially, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT,
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through this process were expressed succinctly by the Senate Judici-
ary Committee in its report accompanying the proposed JJDP Act.
The report noted:
First, most children and youth mature and develop into positive and produc-
tive members of society....
Second, it is well documented that youths whose behavior is noncriminal...
have inordinately preoccupied the attention and resources of the juvenile jus-
tice system. Nearly 40 percent (one-half million per year) of the children
brought to the attention of the juvenile justice system have committed no
criminal act, in adult terms, and are involved simply because they are
juveniles.... These [are] status offenders....
Third, if the status offender were diverted into the social service delivery
network, the remaining juveniles would be those who have committed acts
which, under any circumstances, would be considered criminal.8 4
A. Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO)
The JJDP Act initially required that states wishing to receive
formula grant funds85 submit a plan that would "provide within two
years after submission of the plan that juveniles who are charged
with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if
committed by an adult, shall not be placed in juvenile detention or
correctional facilities, but must be placed in shelter facilities.... ."86
This provision became known as the "deinstitutionalization of status
offenders" (DSO) requirement.8 7 The JJDP Act further directed
HEARINGS ON S. 3148 AND S. 821 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); THE DETENTION AND JAILING OF JUVENILES,
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMi. TO INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
84. S. REP. No. 1011, 93D Cong. 2d Sess. 22-24, reprinted in, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5283, 5287-89.
85. Formula grants are dispersed to states who meet the JJDP Act's mandates re-
garding commitment to deinstitutionalize status offenders and other requirements.
The funds, based on a formula derived from the size of a state's population under age
18, do not have to be spent on deinstitutionalization. For the JJDP Act's original pro-
visions, see The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-415, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (88 Stat. 1109) Title II, Part B, support I
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5601) [hereinafter JJDP].
86. JJDP at § 223(a)(12).
87. Considerations favoring a DSO policy. includech
(1) Incarceration in closed facilities is harmful to the positive development
of youth.
(2) Institutions are not effective in rehabilitating residents.
(3) Institutional corrections is not cost effective.'
(4) Incarceration with criminally involved individuals contaminates the non-
criminal youth, providing an environment where criminal activity is glamor-
ized and the techniques and methods are learned by the noncriminal child
(schools of crime notion).
(5) Deprivation of liberty for persons who have not violated the criminal
code is unjust, and possibly unconstitutional, because such limitations of free-
that participating states "provide for an adequate system of monitor-
ing jails, detention facilities, and correctional facilities to insure that
the [DSO]... requirements are met, and for annual reporting of the
results of such monitoring to the Administrator."88
In 1975, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP), newly established by the JJDP Act, translated its provi-
sions into federal guidelines9 requiring state plans to describe "in de-
tail the State's specific plan, procedure, and timetable for assuring
that within two years of submission of its plan, status offenders9O, if
placed outside the home, would be placed in shelter facilities, group
homes, or other community-based alternatives rather than juvenile
detention or correctional facilities." 91
Subsequent amendments to the JJDP Act and regulations promul-
gated by OJJDP adjusted the DSO requirements, particularly, in the
following areas: (1) substantial compliance, (2) the valid court order,
and (3) de minimis exceptions.
1. Substantial Compliance
On October 3, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed the Juvenile
Justice Amendments of 1977 into law. The new law substantially re-
vised the timetable for DSO and codified the concept of "substantial
compliance" introduced by OJJDP in its guidelines.92 As the Chair-
man of the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delin-
quency, Senator Birch Bayh advised his colleagues that
some additional flexibility must be provided to the States in their efforts to
meet the deinstitutionalization requirement. Otherwise, many currently par-
ticipating States-States that have acted in good faith to meet the 2-year dead-
dom neither reflect the status offender's dangerousness to the community nor
principles of due process and equal protection.
(6) Juveniles develop a fixed self image as a delinquent primarily in re-
sponse to being treated as a delinquent by persons in authority (labeling
theory).
J. Howell, Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: Briefing Paper, 1 Sept. 18, 1990)
(on file at the office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention).
88. JJPD at § 223(a)(14).
89. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, GUIDELINE MANUAL M 4100.1D,
(July 10, 1975).
90. The JJDP Act defined "status offenders" as "juveniles who are charged with
or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult."
JJDP at § 223(a)(12). For a further definition of "status offender" as it pertains to
monitoring and reporting, see Council of State Governments, Status Offenders: A
Working Definition, (unpublished document on file at the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention) (1976).
91. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, supra note 89.
In 1977, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency reported that "Approxi-
mately 70 percent of the girls and 23 percent of the boys committed to detention cen-
ters and correctional institutions are status offenders, according to National Criminal
Justice Information and Statistics Service reports." 1 YOUTH FORuM 6 (1977).
92. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, GUIDELINE MANUAL M. 4100,
12(a)(3).
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line may be forced to withdraw, or have their eligibility terminated... under
the formula grant program. The children of those States would be the
losers.... The incentive to continue the deinstitutionalization... would be
severely affected.9 3
The 1977 JJDP Act Amendments defined "substantial compliance"
as "achievement 'of deinstitutionalization of not less than 75 per cen-
turn of such juveniles." 94 It further stipulated that the "unequivocal
commitment" required "appropriate executive or legislative action" 95
and defined a "reasonable time" to achieve compliance as "not ex-
ceeding two additional years."96 The "two additional years," how-
ever, were not added to the original two-year limit, for it had been
extended to "within three years after submission of the initial
plan."97 The expanded grace period led critics, like Representative
John Conyers, to complain that "in effect States have 5 years for full
compliance ... [and] five years ... is too long to jail and imprison
youth who have committed no criminal offense."9 8
In its 1980 Amendments to the JJDP Act, Congress provided an
additional method for establishing substantial compliance with the
JJDP Act's DSO requirements:
[I]f a state had totally removed status offenders and other nonoffenders from
correction facilities within the three year period, as opposed to a 75 percent
reduction of both detention and correctional placements, the maximum time
allowed for full compliance would remain the same-five years.9 9
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor on
provided the committee's rationale:
Current law recognizes no differences between status offenders held in secure
detention and those placed for long periods of time in correction facilities....
The committee is concerned about children who have committed no criminal
93. 123, Cong. Rec., 32,251 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
94. Pub. L. No. 95-115, 91 Stat. 1054 (1977).
95. Id.
96. The 1977 JJDP Act Amendments expanded the Act's DSO requirements to in-
clude "such nonoffenders as dependent or neglected children." JJPD at
§ 223(a)(12)(A).
A new subpart (B) to § 223(a)(12) of the JJDP Act required that states report annu-
ally to OJJDP regarding their progress towards deinstitutionalization. It directed
OJJDP to review the degree to which states insured that status offenders and nonof-
fenders, when placed in facilities, were placed "in the least restrictive alternatives ap-
propriate ... in reasonable proximity to the [juvenile's family] ... and should provide
appropriate services." Id. at 1054.
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Formula Grant Provisions of the Ju-
venile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, amended by, 43 Fed. Reg.
36402, 36403 (1978).
97. Id. at 1053.
98. 123 CONG. REc. 15,505 (1977) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
99. H.R. REP. No. 946, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6098, 6114.
offense being locked away in secure correctional placements for long periods
of time. Secure detention, while still harmful to status offenders and nonof-
fenders, is of shorter duration. The committee believes that States who have
totally ended the practice of placing status offenders and nonoffenders in se-
cure correctional placements within the allowable three year period should
also be judged to have made a good faith effort.100
2. Valid Court Order
Not all opposition to the five-year timetable for DSO has come
from those who find it too lenient. In the report's Supplemental
Views, minority members of the committee, led by ranking minority
member, Representative John Ashbrook, expressed their view that
the current provision "excessively limits the court's ability to respond
to status offenders who chronically and habitually refuse to accept
voluntary treatment recommended by the court."'0 '
On November 19, 1980, Representative Ashbrook, describing the
current law as "a cure worse than the disease," offered an amend-
ment to H.R. 6704 that amended section 223(a)(12)(A) of the JJDP
Act to authorize the detention or confinement of status offenders
who had violated a valid court order.102 The amendment was
adopted on a vote of 239 to 123.
On December 8, 1980, President Carter signed the Juvenile Justice
Amendments of 1980 into law. The new law contained the revisions
regarding substantial compliance and valid court orders described in
the preceding paragraphs.' 03
3. De Minimis Exceptions
Legal Opinion 76-7 of the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration'sl0 4 Office of General Counsel, issued on October 7, 1975, held
that a state's failure to fully comply with the JJDP Act's DSO stipu-
lations within the time frame established by statute would render the
state ineligible for formula grants "unless such failure was de
100. Id. at, 26-27, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6113-14.
101. Id. at 76. Such criticism was not confined to members of Congress. Judge
John Milligan of Ohio asked the House Human Resources Subcommittee: Does Con-
gress intend that every child have the ultimate right, at any age, to decide for himself
whether he will (1) continue to run away from home, (2) go to school; (3) consume
alcohol; or (4) violate legitimate court orders? Id.
102. This act has made it virtually impossible for juvenile courts to deal with
chronic status offenders by denying the court its traditional discretionary power to en-
force valid court orders involving these youth. For the debate and vote on the Ash-
brook amendment see 126 CONG. REc. 30, 214-38 (1980).
103. The United States General Accounting Office is conducting a study of the im-
plementation and impact of the 1980 JJDP Act's valid court order amendment. It is
expected to shed light on state DSO practices.
104. By statute, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention was lo-
cated within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States De-
partment of Justice cite.
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minimis." The opinion further stated that exceptions would be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.
On January 9, 1981, OJJDP published its final policy and criteria
for de minimis exceptions to full compliance in the Federal Register.
While noting the matter "cannot be determined by an inflexible
formula," the policy provided criteria OJJDP would employ in re-
viewing each case "on its merits."105
B. DSO Implementation
Strict enforcement of the JJDP Act's DSO requirement encoun-
tered resistance during the 1970's.106 Police, probation officers, juve-
nile court judges, and others raised issues ranging from how to
properly handle status offenders who are not securely confined to
questions about the federal government's involvement in local affairs.
Nevertheless, efforts to deinstitutionalize status offenders begun in
the late 1960s were accelerated in most jurisdictions following pas-
sage of the JJDP Act and its establishment of OJJDP. Federal funds
available under the JJDP Act became an incentive that encouraged
states and local jurisdictions to deinstitutionalize status offenders and
to establish alternative programs for such youth.
In 1976, OJJDP funded thirteen projects designed to deinstitution-
alize status offenders by prohibiting through statute and regulation,
their placement in detention centers and training schools and by cre-
ating a variety of alternatives to detention for such juveniles, includ-
105. The broad categories cited were: Criterion A "The extent of non-compliance
is insignificant or of slight consequence in terms of the total juvenile population in the
State." Criterion B "The extent to which the instances of non-compliance were in ap-
parent violation of State law or established executive or judicial policy." Criterion C
"The extent to which an acceptable plan has been developed which is designed to elim-
inate the non-compliant incidents within a reasonable time." For a comprehensive de-
lineation of these criteria, see 46 Fed. Reg. 2566-69 (1981).
106. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity in 1978,
Flora Rothman, Chair of the Justice for Children Task Force of the National Council
of Jewish Women, suggested that growing opposition to OJJDP's enforcement of the
JJDP Act's DSO mandate has evidence of the effectiveness of the effort. Oversight
Hearing on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Hearings on Pub. L
No. 93-415. Before the Subcom. on Economic opportunity, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174
(1978) (statement of Flora Rothman).
You may have had some feeling that objections to it have grown stronger, but
I would say not in number as perhaps decibel level, and we feel it is attributa-
ble to the success it has had. We think it is quite remarkable how many
youngsters around this country are no longer in training schools, are no
longer in detention centers because of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act.
Id.
ing foster homes, shelter-care, and home detention.107
In 1979, Malcolm Klein conducted a systematic review of deinstitu-
tionalization efforts nationwide. He concluded that DSO programs
had not been implemented effectively in accordance with their prem-
ises. "They have not been meaningfully evaluated and their effective-
ness cannot be shown."1 08
Klein identified five impediments to DSO and diversion: (1) insuffi-
ciently developed program rationales, (2) inappropriately selected cli-
ent groups, (3) development of insufficient and narrowly conceived
social services and.treatment strategies, (4) professional resistance to
reform attempts, and (5) placement of programs in inappropriate
settings.109
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted a comprehen-
sive study of the federal DSO effort during the period of 1979-1982 to
assess what happened to youth who committed status offenses. The
NAS examined in detail the DSO experience in seven representative
states and drew five conclusions that pertained to all seven:
[1] The placement of status offenders in secure public facilities has been vir-
tually eliminated....
107. An independent evaluation of the program concluded:
Fewer than 10% of status offenders served through the projects were deemed
in need of any kind of alternative residential placement; home placement was
feasible in most cases.
In the most cost-effective circumstances, community-based services for status
offenders were provided at about 20% less than the cost of juvenile justice sys-
tem processing.
Foster homes worked best in cases of younger children, primarily dependent
and neglected.
Short-term shelter-care was identified as the most effective alternative for
those youth requiring residential placements (primarily chronic status
offenders).
Comparisons of DSO and "non-DSO" youths generally showed no differences
in recidivism.
Both of the major strategies for reducing or eliminating the secure confine-
ment of status offenders (developing alternative programs or issuing absolute
prohibitions against confinement) produced unintended side effects.
- Many jurisdictions that developed alternatives without prohibiting con-
finement experienced "net widening" effects in which the alternative pro-
grams were used mainly for juveniles who previously had been handled
on an informal basis.
- The absolute prohibitions against confinement resulted in adjudicating as
"delinquent" many of the cases that were previously treated as status of-
fenses. Also, some youths in need of services were not receiving them.
J. Howell, supra note 87, at 3-4.
108. Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany
of Impediments, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 145 (1979)
("They have not been meaningfully evaluated and their effectiveness cannot be
shown."). Klein combined diversion with DSO for purposes of his review given the in-
terrelationship of the two processes; that is, in juvenile justice system practices, dein-
stitutionalization procedures often involve diverting youths from the formal juvenile
justice system to agencies and organizations outside the system.
109. Id. at 157-81.
[Vol. 18: 389, 1991] Deinstitutionalization
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
[2] There has been a substantial reduction in the use of detention for
preajudicated status offenders....
[3] There has been a decline in the number of youth who commit status of-
fenses and who then enter the juvenile justice system....
[4] For those status offenders who are diverted to some other service system,
the predominant forms of out-of-home care are group homes or foster care
arrangements....
[5] It is unclear what is happening to youth who commit status offenses but
do not enter the juvenile justice system or its closely related diversion
programs .... 110
XI. THE DEBATE CONTINUES
While most observers recognize the desirability of handling most
status offenders outside the formal juvenile justice system thereby
conserving scarce resources for serious offenders, the public discourse
on DSO continues. Today's debate centers on such issues as: (1)
whether status offenders receive needed services without the inter-
vention of the juvenile justice system; (2) whether "chronic" status
offenders should be removed from the juvenile justice system;"' and
(3) the appropriateness of the placement of status offenders in
mental health facilities.
In its 1987 Report, the President's Child Safety Partnership (the
Partnership) cited the crises created by "chronic runaways" who "ac-
count for a disproportionate share of legal, social, psychological, and
medical problems."1 12 The Partnership found these problems were
compounded by local misunderstanding of federal laws and
regulations.11 3
Many cities and towns have expressed exasperation ... that Federal guide-
lines regulating their actions concerning runaways are too restrictive and do
not provide the flexibility needed .... Unfortunately, there seems to be broad
misunderstanding .. . of the provisions of Federal runaway legislation ....
Regulations implementing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act do allow law enforcement officers temporarily to detain runaways while
110. J. Handler, Deinstitutionalization in Seven States: Principal Findings, in
NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OF-
FENDERS, supra note 18 at 88-89.
111. It seems highly probable that those ... who have argued that the rehabili-
tative goals of the [juvenile] court have not been attained are correct; simi-
larly, that this failure ... provides little or no support for any suggestion that
the court be allowed to retain extremely broad discretionary decision-making
power; and, finally, that status offenses are inherently discriminatory in appli-
cation as well as typically unconstitutionally vague in their construction.
Thomas, Are Status Offenders Really So Different? A Comparative and Longitudinal
Assessment, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 438, 441 (1976).
112. A Report to the President-President's Child Safety Partnership at 123 (1987).
113. Id.
various alternatives are considered. 114
OJJDP's National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Run-
away and Thrownaway Children (NISMART) has shed important
light on troublesome runaway status offenders. According to NIS-
MART, in 1988 some 450,000 runaways left or stayed away from
home at least overnight or ran away from juvenile facilities (primar-
ily, group foster homes, residential treatment centers, mental health
facilities, boarding schools, and juvenile detention centers). Of the
12,800 youth who ran away from a juvenile facility, about 40 percent
had run from the same facility within the prior twelve months. Ap-
proximately a third of those who ran away from home had run away
at least once during the previous year at least once.115
The National Coalition of State Juvenile Justice Advisory Groups'
May 1989 Report to the President contends that many youth who
would have been brought into the juvenile justice system as status of-
fenders in the past are now labeled as suffering mental health
problems. This relabeling facilitates their diversion into the mental
health system and their confinement in psychiatric, in lieu of correc-
tional, institutions.
The National Coalition warned:
[In some jurisdictions a lucrative industry has developed to provide alterna-
tive services, specifically mental health services, for noncriminal "acting out"
teenagers. Status offenders often relabeled as mentally ill, are increasingly
being institutionalized in secure mental health settings where conditions par-
allel those found in juvenile correctional facilities, but without the attendant
rights to due process.1 1
6
XII. A "SUBSTANTIAL" SUCCESS STORY
Despite such on-going debates and difficulties, most juvenile justice
professionals would agree that the JJDP Act's goal of state compli-
ance with its DSO mandate has been substantially accomplished. Na-
tional juvenile court data confirm that the JJDP Act had a
significant impact on DSO between 1975 and 1978 when the propor-
114. Id.
115. D. FINKELHOR, G. HOTALING & A. SEDLAK, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY,
AND THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA 97-134 (1990). Copies of the report and its
executive summary may be ordered from the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse, Box
6000, Rockville, MD 20850 (800-638-8736). For an overview of NISMART, see Sweet,
"Missing CWildren'" Found Facts, Nov./Dec. 1990 NIJ REP., at 15 (1990).
About 3 out of 10 [of the 450,000 runaways] ... were without a safe place to
stay at some time during the course of the runaway episode. Parents or care-
takers contacted the police for 4 out of 10 runaways [and 8 percent of the total
were placed in a detention center]. Roughly 3 out of 10 of these runaways
were gone at least a week, and one out of 10 had not returned home at the
time of the interview with the parent....
Id. at 116-118.
116. NATIONAL COALITION OF STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUPS,
PROMISES TO KEEP XXX (1989).
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tion of status offenders detained relative to all juveniles in detention
dropped from forty to fifteen percent. Since 1978, the proportion of
juvenile detainees that are status offenders has continued a steady, if
more gradual, decline.117
As previously noted, the JJDP Act requires participating states to
submit an annual monitoring report to OJJDP.118 The first such re-
port was required by the end of 1976 from. the forty-two states and
territories participating in the formula grant program at that time.
Only twenty-five states had forwarded such reports by the following
March. Among these, eight states had not established monitoring
systems, only nine states provided what could be considered complete
data, and only two states appeared to demonstrate at least a seventy-
five percent reduction in the number of status offenders placed in de-
tention and correctional facilities." 9 By 1979, fifty-one states and ter-
ritories were participating in the JJDP Act program, all of which had
established monitoring systems. Among these, thirty-three states
had demonstrated substantial DSO compliance. Another thirteen
had shown significant progress toward substantial compliance.120
By 1988, fifty-six states (and territories) were participating in the
JJDP Act program. Among these, fifty-one were in full compliance,
or in full compliance with de minimis exceptions, with the DSO
requirements. 121
State monitoring reports submitted to OJJDP by the fifty-six par-
ticipating states and territories demonstrate a ninety-five percent
overall reduction in DSO violations nationally from 1979 to 1988.122
The following have been identified by OJJDP to be the most im-
portant ingredients in participating states' success in achieving DSO:
(1) state legislation prohibiting or severely limiting detention or incarcera-
117. National Center for Juvenile Justice, Response to an Official Request from
OJJDP for Statistical Information Regarding Deinstitutionalization of Status Offend-
ers and Jail Removal 3 (1990) (unpublished document. For additional data on deten-
tion of status offenders see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, 1975-85:
CENSUS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DETENTION, CORRECTIONAL, AND SHELTER FACILITIES,
1975, 1977, 1979, 1983, and 1985 (1989).
118. JJDP at § 223 (a)(15).
119. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REMOVING STATUS OFFENDERS FROM SECURE
FACILITIES: FEDERAL LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE ARE NEEDED 31 (1978).
120. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1979 Summary of State
Compliance (March, 1980) (unpublished document).
121. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1988 Summary of State
Compliance (October 1990) (unpublished document).
122. DSO violations were reduced from 188,007 to 9741. Personal Communication,
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (October 16, 1990).
tion of status offenders, 1 2 3
(2) 24-hour court intake,
(3) objective detention criteria that mirrors or are more restrictive than state
laws,
(4) local commitment and involvement in DSO efforts,
(5) availability and use of nonsecure community-based alternatives-both
residential and non-residential.
12 4
OJJDP is sponsoring a study, currently underway, assessing the ef-
fects of DSO on involved youths, youth-serving agencies, and the ju-
venile justice system. The research will examine DSO programs in
three categories of state approaches: (1) the "treatment" model-in
which status offending behavior is seen as a symptom of a larger
problem for which remediation is needed; (2) the "normalization"
model-which views status offending behavior as a normal process of
growing up; and (3) a deterrence approach favoring intensive treat-
ment through judicial control and/or secure detention.125
XIII. CONCLUSION
DSO must be viewed within the larger context of juvenile justice
reform. Since its enactment in 1974, the JJDP Act has stimulated
numerous improvements, including adoption of standards for the ad-
ministration of juvenile justice, juvenile code revisions, improved
conditions of confinement, improved police investigation techniques,
selective and vertical prosecution of habitual offenders, more effec-
tive treatment of serious and violent offenders, development of such
system alternatives as restitution and intensive probation, expanded
volunteer programs, increased public awareness and involvement in
juvenile justice issues and development of statewide programs and in-
frastructures for coordination of youth services.
The success of the DSO movement cannot be measured solely in
terms of the removal of nonoffenders and status offenders from se-
cure detention centers and training schools. Until DSO's impact on
the juvenile system's response to status offenders, particularly run-
aways and chronic noncriminal offenders, is adequately assessed and
found acceptable, only the first phase of this important mandate for
reform will have been achieved.
Removing noncriminal juveniles from secure confinement may
123. As of February 1988, 19 states had statutes that prohibited secure detention or
incarceration of status offenders personal communication. National Center for Juve-
nile Justice (October 16, 1990). Others have enacted laws limiting such practices. Still
others have executive or judicial policies that prohibit or limit them.
124. Widely used residential alternatives include shelter-care, emergency foster
care and group homes. Home detention, after-school report centers and counseling pro-
grams are popular non-residential alternatives.
125. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ASSESSING THE
EFFECTS OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS: A JUVENILE JUSTICE BUL-
LETIN 2-3 (1989).
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well prove to be the easiest part of the process. Ensuring effective
programs and services that reduce recidivism and deter future status
offenses or delinquent acts is the far more complex challenge facing
those not simply pursuing compliance with the JJDP Act, but seek-
ing to build a juvenile justice system that helps our troubled youth,
strengthens our families, and protects our citizens. 126
126. "The interest of the public is served not only by rehabilitating juveniles when
that is possible, but the interest of the public is also served by removing some juveniles
from environments where they are likely to harm their fellow citizens." In re Win-
burn, 32 Wis. 2d. 152, 161, 145 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1966).

